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How does corruption influence perceptions of the risk of nuclear 
accidents?: cross-country analysis after the 2011 Fukushima 
disaster in Japan.  
 
 
 
 
Abstract. Japan’s 2011 natural disasters were accompanied by a devastating nuclear disaster in 
Fukushima. This paper used cross-country data obtained immediately after the Japanese 
disaster to explore how, and the extent to which, corruption affects the perception of citizens 
regarding the risk of nuclear accidents. Endogeneity bias was controlled for using instrumental 
variables. The cross-country analysis showed that citizens in less corrupt countries tend to 
perceive there to be a lower possibility of nuclear accident. 
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1. Introduction 
 
On March 11, 2011 one of the most devastating earthquakes in history hit Japan. The earthquake 
was accompanied by a tsunami arriving at the northeastern coast of Japan. Many precious lives, 
approximately 18,000, were lost because they were unable to escape the tsunami. Of those that did 
escape, hundreds of thousands lost their homes: ―Estimates vary, but the World Bank and Japanese 
government say that there’s somewhere between $122 billion and $235 billion worth of damage to 
clean up‖ (Hammer, 2011, 28). As a consequence of the 2011 natural disasters, the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear plants, facing the northeastern coast, were crippled, resulting in nuclear leakage. 
The nuclear leakage resulted in a mass evacuation of the areas surrounding the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear plants. Furthermore, the Japanese nuclear accidents have had a tremendous impact not only 
on the areas stricken by the natural disasters, but also areas some distance from the northeastern 
coastal area. Sufficient electricity could not to be supplied to Tokyo because of the nuclear accident. 
Once the demand for electricity outweighs its supply, power failures would occur over a large part of 
Tokyo. With the aim of avoiding such a situation, it was planned that in March 2011 that the 
electricity supply would be cut off in some areas in Tokyo. However, as a result of these cuts, 
economic activity slowed significantly, having a detrimental effect on the Japanese economy. The 
catastrophe that occurred in Japan was the result of not only a natural disaster but also a nuclear 
one. The nuclear disaster rating given for Japan’s nuclear accident was level 7, a rating level that 
has only been used once before with the Chernobyl disaster. During the disaster process, the 
Japanese government was criticized because they did not provide accurate information regarding the 
situation at the nuclear plants. As a result, Japanese citizens now feel embarrassed and their levels 
of fear regarding the accident have increased. Furthermore, a number of foreign firms have relocated 
their offices from Japan to other Asian countries. 
Catastrophes caused by natural and nuclear disasters can trigger controversy regarding nuclear 
policy, drawing greater attention to the issue and becoming a hot topic worldwide.1 For example, 
Dempsey (2011) noted, ―after the catastrophe in Japan, Mrs. Merkel reversed a pro-nuclear policy 
that she adopted just last year and temporary shut down seven of Germany’s 17 nuclear plants.‖ 
Despite the change in pro-nuclear policy, Merkel’s conservative Christian Democrats suffered a 
major election defeat 2 weeks after the Japanese disaster. Furthermore, EU environment ministers 
gathered in Brussels and expressed support for a proposal from Austria to monitor the security of 
operating nuclear plants. The G8 Summit was held in France 2 months after the Japanese disaster, 
and Europe and Japan agreed to join forces in an effort to promote tighter international standards 
for nuclear safety. In contrast with Germany, France and the United States, however, have continued 
                                                   
1 Kahn (2007) empirically examined the impact of disasters on risk regulation and provided evidence 
that liberal representatives were likely to increase the number of their votes in favor of risk 
regulation. 
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with their pro-nuclear energy policy. Such actions show the range in attitudes toward nuclear energy 
policy among G8 countries. 
There are number of factors associated with the damage caused by natural disasters: economic 
condition (e.g., human capital), economic openness, size of government (Toya and Skidmore, 2007), 
and the media (Besley and Burgess, 2002; Eisensee and Strӧmberg, 2007). In addition, quality of 
governance is also thought to influence the level of damage caused by disasters. Governance, 
however, does not affect the likelihood that a natural disaster will occur. In contrast with natural 
disasters, technological disasters, such as a nuclear accident, are considered to be the result of 
human error. Thus, I would argue that the risk of nuclear disaster depends, in part, on the quality of 
governance. Hence, a citizen’s perception regarding the risk of nuclear accidents appears to be 
associated with the quality of governance. With the exception of levels of natural resources, 
governance influences the view of citizens regarding nuclear energy, which is reflected in the nuclear 
policy of various countries.  
It was not only the Japanese who were shocked by the 2011 disasters. Citizens worldwide were 
shaken by the devastation—especially those in countries with nuclear plants, with their thoughts 
turning to nuclear accidents in their own countries. The extent to which the Japanese disaster will 
influence the views of citizens regarding the possibility of nuclear accidents will be seen in their 
voting behavior, and, ultimately, in their nuclear policies. The classic work of Hinman et al. (1993) 
attempted to analyze the perception of risk regarding nuclear energy. Visucursi and Zeckhauser 
(2006) sought to ascertain the determinants of subjective disaster fatality risk. However, little is 
known about the effect that quality of governance may have on the subjective risk of nuclear plants. 
Recently, a number of works have found that unexpected disaster is associated with subjective 
well-being (e.g., Carroll et al., 2009; Luechinger and Saschkly, 2009). Since the occurrence of serious 
nuclear accidents such as Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, the security of nuclear energy has been 
brought to the public’s attention worldwide. Berger (2010) has presented findings that Chernobyl’s 
nuclear accident led citizens who lived far from Chernobyl to take an interest in that environmental 
issue immediately after the disaster. Almond et al. (2007) found that the accumulation of human 
capital in Sweden was affected by the Chernobyl nuclear accident, implying that the long-term 
effects of nuclear disaster crossed international boundaries. Thus, it is worth investigating the level 
of influence that the Fukushima accident has had on the perception of citizens who live far from the 
accident site. Of fundamental interest in this paper is how citizens around the world perceive 
Japan’s disasters and how corruption influences the perception of those citizens. To this end, by 
using cross-country data collected after the Japan disaster, this paper examines how corruption in 
the public sector influences the view of citizens regarding the possibility of nuclear disaster. The key 
finding from this analysis was that public sectors with less corruption produce citizens who believe 
there to be a lower possibility of nuclear disaster. 
The structure of this paper is as follows: section 2 proposes the hypothesis; data and method 
are explained in section 3; the estimation results are reported in section 4; and the final section 
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presents the conclusion. 
 
2. Hypothesis 
 
Catastrophe is believed to increase through a combination of actions by nature and humans 
(Zeckhauser, 1996). Within a competitive market, competitive pressure will induce electricity 
companies to ensure the security of their nuclear plants. The current situation in Japan is that of a 
significantly contracted electricity market, with a large share of the market occupied by a few 
incumbent companies. Thus, electricity companies in Japan have sizable market power and obtain 
greater profits than in a competitive market.  
Electricity companies are considered a special interest group and so use rent-seeking behavior to 
protect their vested interest. In response, corrupt government regulators have assisted the 
companies by erecting entry barriers for the purpose of providing monopoly profits for favored 
producers (Bliss and Di Tella, 1997). Public sector corruption enables favored industry companies to 
build plants that would otherwise fail government safety standards (Escaleras et al., 2007). The 
Tokyo Electric Power Co., which operates the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plants, ignored warnings 
that the reactors were vulnerable. Government regulators in Japan have favored the Tokyo Electric 
Power Co., for example, ―Just a month before a powerful earthquake and tsunami crippled the plant 
… government regulators provide a 10-year extension for the oldest of the six reactors at the power 
station despite warnings about its safety‖ (Tabuchi et al., 2011). The probability of a catastrophe had 
not been appropriately assessed and those values were not disseminated, which, in turn, resulted in 
poor outcomes (Zeckhauser, 1996). Thus, the catastrophe that struck the Fukushima nuclear plants 
may be the result of a conspiracy of nature and humans. If this holds true, the perceptions the risk of 
nuclear plants among citizens will be greater in public sectors with higher levels of corruption. 
These considerations lead me to propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis: Corruption leads citizens to believe the possibility that a nuclear accident could occur.  
 
3. Data and method 
3.1. Data 
Table 1 provides the definitions of the variables used in this paper and the results for the 
mean difference test between countries with and without nuclear plants. Table A1 in the appendix 
lists the countries used in this analysis. Approximately 2 weeks after Japan’s 2011 natural disasters, 
a survey regarding nuclear energy was conducted by WIN-Gallup International (2011). Respondents 
in 39 countries were asked : ―How high or low is your concern about the possibility of a nuclear 
incident in your country?‖ There were five response choices: ―very high‖, ―high‖, ―medium‖, ―low‖, and 
―very low‖. The response rates from each county are available from WIN-Gallup International (2011). 
Based on this survey, I calculated the rate of the respondents that believed there to be a high (or very 
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high) possibility of a nuclear accident—dependent variable (PNACCI). The average PNACCI for 
countries with nuclear plants is 32.6%, whereas that for countries without nuclear plants is 49.4%. 
The difference is significant at the 1% level. This indicates that nuclear plants can be built because 
citizens believe that nuclear accidents are unlikely to occur. 
The key independent variable in this analysis is a proxy for the degree of corruption. I used the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)2 as the corruption proxy. The CPI scale has values from 0 
(highly corrupted) to 10 (least corrupted). That is, the higher values on the CPI indicate less 
corruption. This index, which was launched in 1995, is published by Transparency International. 
The CPI has been widely used to measure cross-country corruption (for example, see Lambsdorff, 
2006). The CPI is a composite index, drawing on 15 different polls and surveys from 9 independent 
institutions, conducted among business people and country analysts, and it includes residential 
surveys on both locals and expatriates. The CPI focuses on corruption in the public sector. The 
surveys used in compiling the CPI ask questions regarding the misuse of public power for private 
benefit, with a focus, for example, on bribe-taking by public officials in public procurement. The 
sources do not distinguish between administrative and political corruption. As presented in Table 1, 
the average CORR (degree of corruption) for countries with nuclear plants is 5.75 points, whereas 
that for countries without nuclear plants is 4.14. Furthermore, the CORR among them is 
significantly different at the 5% level. This implies that pro-nuclear energy policies tend to be 
supported in less corrupt countries. 
The relationship between CORR and PNACCI (the perceived possibility of nuclear accident) is 
illustrated in Fig. 1(a). Canada, the Netherlands, Finland, and Iceland showed large CORR values of 
approximately 9 points and low PNACCI of approximately 15%. While CORR for Germany and 
Austria takes a similar value (8 points), PNACCI becomes higher (40% and 60% for Germany and 
Austria, respectively). This seems to be consistent with the political situation in these countries. 
That is, after Japan's disaster, the Green party won the election in Germany. Austria proposed that 
EU countries should monitor the security of operating nuclear plants. In contrast, Kenya, Nigeria, 
Morocco, Georgia, and China exhibit small CORR values of approximately 3 points and high 
PNACCI values of approximately 75%. On the whole, there is negative relationship between CORR 
and PNACCI. The corruption of the public sector is directly associated with the security of nuclear 
energy when a country possesses a nuclear plant. With regard to the sample limited to countries 
possessing nuclear plants, the relationship was demonstrated again; the negative relationship 
continued in Fig. 1(b). CORR for China, Brazil, India, and Romania was approximately 4 points. 
PNACCI for Brazil, India, and Romania was approximately 55%, while China’s was 80%. This shows 
that PNACCI in China is remarkably higher than other countries with the same level of CORR. This 
result seems to reflect that fact that human rights are not well protected in China and, therefore, 
                                                   
2 An important issue is how to define corruption. There are many definitions, and most share a 
common denominator that can be expressed as follows: ―the abuse of public authority or position for 
private gains.‖ The data are available at 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi (accessed February 2, 2011). 
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nuclear energy is not appropriately secured. Fig. 1(a) and (b) only illustrate the relationship between 
CORR and PNACCI and not the causality. Therefore, I will examine causality using regression 
estimation later in the paper.  
To examine the hypotheses raised previously, the estimated function of regression takes the 
following form: 
 
PNACCIi = 0 + 1NUCLEi + 2CORRi + 3NDISi + 4Ln(GDP) i + 5ln(POP)i + ui,                                                        
 
where the dependent variable is prefecture PNACCIi in country i and  represents the regression 
parameters. ui is the error term. NUCLE is number of existing nuclear plants.3  
With regard to the hypothesis concerning the effect of corruption, I anticipate that 2 will be 
negative. However, there seems to be a reverse causality that the perceived possibility of nuclear 
accidents has an influence on corruption in the public sector. This is because citizens who believe 
that nuclear accidents are likely to occur are inclined to have a great incentive to monitor the 
activities of the government and public sector. As a consequence, the results of OLS estimations are 
considered to suffer endogeneity bias. With regard to NUCLE, pro-nuclear policy is inclined to be 
supported and nuclear plants are likely to be built if citizens believe that nuclear accidents are 
unlikely to occur. I interpret this to be reverse causality, resulting in endogeneity bias. To control for 
the bias, I used instrumental variables to conduct GMM 2SLS (generalized method of moments two 
stage) estimations. With respect to endogeneity of NUCLE, the building of nuclear energy plants 
requires sufficient land area. It is difficult to find the space to build such plants in more densely 
populated countries. Hence, DENS (population density) and LAND (land area) are used as 
instrumental variables for the GMM 2SLS estimations. Table 1 shows that the average LAND of 
countries with nuclear plants is larger than that of countries without nuclear plants. Furthermore, 
LAND among the studied countries is significantly different at the 5% level. DENS and LAND 
variables were obtained from the World Development Indicators.4 Existing literature provided 
evidence that legal origin and religion obviously influence the government performance (La Porta et 
al., 1999) and corruption (Treisman, 2000; Serra, 2006, Gokcekus, 2008; Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 
2008). Escaleras et al. (2007) considered the total Protestant population rate and the legal origin 
dummy as exogenous variables, and used them as instrumental variables for corruption in the public 
sector to examine the effect of corruption on the level of damage from natural disasters.5 In this 
paper, following Escaleras et al. (2007), variables capturing legal origin and religion can be 
                                                   
3 The data were collected from the homepage of the European Nuclear Society 
http://www.euronuclear.org/info/npp-ww.htm (accessed May 2, 2011). 
4 The data are available from HP of the World Bank http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do 
(accessed March 28, 2011). 
5 In addition to the Protestant rate of the total population and the legal origin dummy, Escaleras et 
al. (2007) used an index of democracy and the risk of political violence as instrumental variables. 
This paper, however, did not use these instrumental variables because the sample size decreases 
when these variables are used. 
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considered to be determinants of CORR and are therefore used to control for endogeneity in CORR. 
PROTE (Protestant rate), CATHO (Catholic rate), and LEGAL (which is 1 if legal origin is French, 
otherwise 0) are also used as instrumental variables. Data for PROTE, CATHO, and LEGAL were 
sourced from La Porta et al. (1999). 
Following existing literature (e.g., Kahn 2005; Toya and Skidmore, 2007; Escaleras et al., 2007), 
with regard to control variables, the number of natural disasters since 1990 is included to capture 
the experience of natural disasters.6 GDP (per capita GDP) and POP (population) are included to 
capture economic conditions.7  
 
4. Results 
Table 2 shows the results of the OLS estimation. The second stage results of the GMM 2SLS  
estimations are presented in Table 3(a). Tables 3(b) and (c) show the findings of the first stage of the 
GMM 2SLS estimations, showing the results for the determinants of NUCLE and CORR, 
respectively. In each table, results using a full sample are exhibited in columns (1) and (2), and the 
results for the sample of those countries possessing nuclear plants are shown in columns (3) and (4). 
Table 2 shows that the sign for CORR is negative in all estimations, while being statistically 
significant in columns (1), (2), and (4). Column (3) is insignificant, in part, because a reduction in 
sample size appears to reduce statistical significance. Significant negative signs for NUCLE in all 
columns is interpreted as follows: the governments of countries possessing nuclear plants are 
considered to make a greater effort to ensure the safety of nuclear energy to lead their electorates to 
support pro-nuclear policy. However, there is the possibility of reversing the direction of causality 
when citizens consider nuclear energy as safety and therefore support pro-nuclear policy, resulting in 
the building of nuclear plants. As discussed later in the paper, the results of the GMM 2SLS 
estimation identify the effect of NUCLE on PNACCI. Coefficients of NDIS take positive signs and 
are statistically significant at the 1% level in all estimations. From the view of rational Bayesian 
learning, one would expect assessed risk to increase after experiencing a natural disaster. Thus, the 
experience of a natural disaster results in citizens perceiving a higher exogenous nature-related risk, 
thus, their perceived risk of nuclear accidents is higher. 
Turning to the results in Table 3(a), we will check the validity of the GMM 2SLS estimations 
before discussing the results for each variable. The over-identification test provided a method of 
testing for exogeneity in instrumental variables. Test statistics were not significant in columns 
(1)–(4) and, therefore, do not reject the null hypothesis that the instrumental variables are 
uncorrelated with the error term. In addition, F-statistics show statistical significance in all 
estimations of Tables 3(b) and (c). This suggests that the estimation results of GMM 2SLS are valid 
in all estimations. NUCLE continues to produce significant negative signs in Table 3(a). Absolute 
                                                   
6 NDIS was obtained from the International Disaster Database: http://www.emdat.be (accessed April 
30, 2011). 
7 GDP and GOVSIZ come from Penn World Table 6.3. 
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php (accessed April 30, 2011). 
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values for NUCLE are generally greater than 0.80. Compared with Table 2, NUCLE has greater 
absolute values. This suggests that countries possessing a greater number of nuclear plants appear 
to make an effort to decrease the possibility of nuclear accidents, and provide sufficient information 
regarding nuclear energy. As a consequence, its citizens perceive the possibility of a nuclear accident 
to be low. With regard to CORR, and in line with the results in Table 2, CORR yields negative signs 
and is statistically significant in columns (1)–(4). This implies that the negative effect of CORR on 
PNACCI is robust even after controlling for the endogeneity of NUCLE. Absolute values of CORR are 
5.99 and 5.19 in columns (1) and (2), respectively, whereas they are 3.79 and 4.21 in columns (3) and 
(4), respectively. I interpret these results to suggest that a 1-point increase in CORR leads to an 
approximate 5% decrease in the perceived possibility of a nuclear accident for the full sample. 
Furthermore, a 1-point increase in CORR leads to an approximate 4% decrease in the perceived 
possibility of a nuclear accident for the sample limited to countries with nuclear plants. This implies 
that the influence of corruption decreases when the sample is limited to countries possessing nuclear 
plants. The combined results regarding CORR in Tables 2 and 3(a) support the hypothesis suggested 
earlier. The coefficient for NDIS takes the positive sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level 
in all estimations. The absolute values for NDIS range from 0.16 to 0.18, meaning that these values 
to not change when the sample is restricted to countries with nuclear plants. Concerning Ln(GDP) 
and Ln(POP), they do not become statistically significant in any columns. Hence, Ln(GDP) and 
Ln(POP) do not influence the perceived risk of nuclear accident.  
With respect to the first stage results of GMM 2SLS, as is presented in Table 3(b), the coefficients 
for LAND take the positive sign in all estimation. In addition, LAND is statistically significant at the 
5% level in columns (1) and (2), although it is not statistically significant in columns (3) and (4). The 
results for LAND support the assumption that sufficient land area is required to build nuclear plants. 
In Table 3(c), PROTE yields the positive sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level in 
columns (1)–(4), which is consistent with the evidence provided in existing literature (Treisman, 
2000; Gokcekus, 2008; Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2008).  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Japan’s 2011 natural disasters were accompanied by a devastating nuclear disaster, resulting 
in catastrophe. The G8 Summit was held in France 2 months after the Japanese disaster, with 
nuclear policy being a key issue. Thus, Japan’s disaster had a tremendous impact on nuclear 
policy, not only in Japan but also worldwide. As suggested by Escaleras et al. (2007), corruption in 
the public sector may influence the level of damage caused by natural disasters because corruption 
can lead to reduced building safety, and, therefore, the reduced ability to withstand such disasters. 
Corruption is thought to affect not only the physical strength of buildings but also citizens’ 
perceptions regarding the strength of buildings. If this is true, corruption can reduce a nuclear 
plant’s resistance to natural disaster, such as earthquake and tsunami; thereby, influencing the 
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perception of citizens regarding the risk of nuclear accidents. The primary contention in this 
paper is that public sector corruption can be expected to lead citizens to believe that nuclear 
accidents are likely to occur. This paper used cross-country data compiled immediately after the 
2011 Japanese disasters to explore how, and the extent to which, corruption affects citizens’ 
perceptions regarding the possibility of nuclear accidents. To control for endogeneity bias caused 
by corruption and existing nuclear plants, a GMM 2SLS model was used. From these 
estimations I found that citizens from less corrupt countries tend to believe that there is a lower 
possibility of nuclear accident. 
   Based on the results presented thus far in this paper, I propose that it is important that 
corruption in the public sector be reduced to ensure lower levels of perceived and objective risks 
regarding nuclear accidents. Transparency of government enables citizens to access accurate 
information, reducing information asymmetry between citizens and government. Thus, the cost 
of obtaining information decreases. As a result, government is expected to become less corrupt 
because politicians wish to increase their likelihood of re-election, and seek the support of the 
entire electorate rather than special interest groups. As asserted by Besley and Burgess, 
―Elections provided an incentive for politicians to perform which can be enhanced by 
development of the media. Through this mechanism we would expect responsiveness of the 
government to salient issues such as crisis management to be greater where the medial is more 
developed‖ (Besley and Burgess 2002, 1445). The role of the media is considered to have become 
more important in transmitting accurate information to ensure an effectively functioning 
democracy, especially when unexpected disasters occur. As was discussed and agreed at the 2011 
G8 Summit, the risk of subsequent nuclear accidents is expected to be reduced. This result is, in 
part, thanks to a well-developed media network, consisting not only of newspaper, TV, and radio, 
but also the Internet. 
The sample size of this paper is very small, reducing the accuracy of the estimations. Human 
capital and the development of the media are considered to be key factors that determine the 
perceived risk of nuclear plants. These variables, however, cannot be incorporated as independent 
variables because the sample size reduces when these variables are included in the function. Hence, 
it is necessary to use a larger sample for reporting results with greater accuracy. Furthermore, 
aggregated level cross-country data were used in this paper and, as such, individual characteristics 
such as sex, marital status, age, and income level cannot be controlled for. For a closer examination 
of the effect of corruption, individual-level data should be compiled and used. These issues need to be 
addressed in future studies.  
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Fig. 1(a). Relationship between corruption and the perceived possibility of a nuclear accident  
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Fig. 1(b). Relationship between corruption and the perceived possibility of a nuclear accident 
(countries with nuclear plants)  
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Table 1. Variable definitions and mean difference tests 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Values in parentheses are absolute t-statistics. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
PNACCI was obtained from WIN-Gallup International (2011). CORR was sourced from 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi (accessed April 28, 2011). NUCLE was collected from HP of European Nuclear 
Society, http://www.euronuclear.org/info/npp-ww.htm (accessed May 2, 2011). GDP and GOVSIZ were sourced from the Penn World Table 6.3, 
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php (accessed April 30, 2011). NDIS was obtained from the International Disaster Database 
http://www.emdat.be (accessed April 30, 2011). PROTE, CATHO, and LEGAL were sourced from La Porta et al. (1999), 
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/dataset (accessed April 30, 2011). Countries where LEGAL takes 1 are exhibited in Table A1.
 Definition With nuclear plants. Without nuclear plants. Absolute 
value of 
t-statistics 
PNACCI Rate of respondents think high (or very high) 
possibility of that nuclear accident (%) 
32.6 49.4 2.73*** 
             Independent variables 
NUCLE Number of nuclear plants existed in the country. 21.9 --- --- 
CORR Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in 2009 5.75 4.14 2.47** 
NDIS Total number of natural disasters since 1990. 114 38 2.66** 
GDP 
 
GDP per capita. (Million dollars) 2.4 1.5 2.13** 
POP Population(million) 189.0 34.2 2.15* 
              Instrumental variable 
DENS Population density(/km2) 17.3 38.1 0.70 
LAND Land area (thousand km2) 3002.1 372.4 2.82*** 
PROTE Protestant rate (%) 18.5 9.02 1.39 
CATHO Catholic rate (%) 
 
28.9 24.7 0.41 
LEGAL It takes 1 if legal origin is French, otherwise 0.   --- --- --- 
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Table 2.   
OLS estimations for dependent variable: PNACCI  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Full sample      With nuclear countries 
    (1)    (2)      (5) (6) 
NUCLE -0.76*** 
(-3.98) 
-0.71*** 
(-3.89) 
 -0.73*** 
(-3.32) 
-0.79*** 
(-4.18) 
CORR -4.05** 
(-2.14) 
-3.87** 
(-2.14) 
 -4.28 
(-1.60) 
-4.77* 
(-1.99) 
NDIS 0.16*** 
(3.73) 
0.13*** 
(4.33) 
 0.16*** 
(4.16) 
0.18*** 
(8.44) 
Ln(GDP) 
 
4.23 
(0.75) 
4.44 
(0.80) 
 13.0 
(1.59) 
13.5* 
(1.70) 
Ln(POP) -1.81 
(-0.72) 
  1.82 
(0.69) 
 
Constant 
 
32.8 
(0.63) 
12.9 
(0.27) 
 -97.4 
(-1.44) 
-81.1 
(-1.28) 
Adjusted R2 0.37 0.37  0.76 0.75 
Observations 39 39  19 19 
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Table 3(a)  
GMM2SLS estimations for dependent variable: PNACCI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Values in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       With nuclear countries 
   (1) (2)      (3) (4) 
NUCLE -0.88*** 
(-3.18) 
-0.89*** 
(-3.21) 
 -0.82*** 
(-2.97) 
-0.78*** 
(-3.13) 
CORR -5.99** 
(-2.36) 
-5.19** 
(-2.47) 
 -3.79* 
(-1.70) 
-4.21** 
(-2.20) 
NDIS 0.18*** 
(3.62) 
0.16*** 
(3.72) 
 0.17*** 
(3.99) 
0.18*** 
(5.63) 
Ln(GDP) 
 
8.88 
(1.43) 
8.42 
(1.40) 
 12.9 
(1.55) 
12.4 
(1.59) 
Ln(POP) -2.05 
(-0.90) 
  1.80 
(0.89) 
 
Constant 
 
0.75 
(0.02) 
-18.6 
(-0.38) 
 -97.5 
(-1.41) 
-72.8 
(-1.12) 
Over-identification 
(Sargan) Test 
1.10 
P-value=0.77 
0.63 
P-value=0.88 
 1.10 
P-value=0.57 
1.91 
P-value=0.59 
Observations  39 39  19 19 
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Table 3(b)  
Results of the first stage GMM 2SLS estimation for dependent variable: NUCLE.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors. ** and *** denote significance at the 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. Instrumental variables are land area and population density for 2009. These variables were obtained 
from the World Development Indicators 2010 (CD-Rom version). 
 
 
       With nuclear countries 
   (1) (2)      (3) (4) 
LAND 
 
0.0001** 
(2.66) 
0.0001** 
(2.47) 
 0.0001 
(1.57) 
0.0001 
(1.47) 
DENS -1.53 
(-1.06) 
-1.69 
(-1.17) 
 9.62 
(0.74) 
7.82 
(0.63) 
PROTE 
 
0.09 
(1.29) 
0.10 
(1.47) 
 -0.06 
(-0.43) 
-0.03 
(-0.24) 
CATHO -0.07 
(-1.33) 
-0.08 
(-1.60) 
 -0.09 
(-0.53) 
-0.12 
(-0.75) 
LEGAL -0.96 
(-0.27) 
-1.80 
(-0.52) 
 -6.35 
(-0.53) 
-6.22 
(-0.53) 
NDIS 0.13*** 
(6.04) 
0.11*** 
(7.15) 
 0.14*** 
(4.13) 
0.12*** 
(5.26) 
Ln(GDP) 
 
5.92** 
(2.67) 
6.88*** 
(3.41) 
 14.4** 
(2.48) 
15.8** 
(2.99) 
Ln(POP) -1.58 
(1.04) 
  -2.21 
(-0.69) 
 
Constant 
 
-42.1 
(-1.46) 
-65.5*** 
(-3.65) 
 -116.1 
(-1.63) 
-151.0*** 
(-3.11) 
F-statistics 19.5 
P=0.00 
22.1 
P=0.00 
 8.48 
P=0.00 
10.1 
P=0.00 
Observations  39  39  19 19 
5 
 
Table 3(c)  
Results of the first stage GMM 2SLS estimation for dependent variable: CORRU  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Instrumental variables are land area and population density for 2009. These variables were 
obtained from World Development Indicators 2010 (CD-Rom version). 
 
 
       With nuclear countries 
   (1) (2)      (3) (4) 
LAND 
 
-0.007*10-2 
(-1.41) 
-0.006*10-2 
(-1.23) 
 -0.006*10-2 
(-0.96) 
-0.004*10-2 
(-0.75) 
DENS 0.37** 
(2.36) 
0.38** 
(2.47) 
 1.41 
(1.35) 
1.59 
(1.57) 
PROTE 
 
0.04*** 
(5.36) 
0.04*** 
(5.30) 
 0.04*** 
(3.79) 
0.04*** 
(3.76) 
CATHO 0.01** 
(2.16) 
0.01** 
(2.43) 
 0.01 
(1.23) 
0.02 
(1.52) 
LEGAL -0.44 
(-1.16) 
-0.37 
(-1.00) 
 -0.53 
(-0.54) 
-0.54 
(-0.57) 
NDIS -0.0003 
(-0.15) 
0.0009 
(0.56) 
 -0.0008 
(-0.30) 
0.0008 
(0.41) 
Ln(GDP) 
 
1.46*** 
(6.08) 
1.38*** 
(6.33) 
 1.65*** 
(3.48) 
1.51*** 
(3.45) 
Ln(POP) 0.14 
(0.85) 
  0.22 
(0.84) 
 
Constant 
 
-11.3*** 
(-3.62) 
-9.27*** 
(-4.78) 
 -14.3** 
(-2.48) 
-10.9** 
(-2.73) 
F-statistics 25.8 
P=0.00 
28.8 
P=0.00 
 14.2 
P=0.000 
16.6 
P=0.000 
Observations  39  39  19 19 
 1 
APPENDIX. Table A1. Lists of countries used in the analysis 
With nuclear plants Without nuclear plants 
Belgium # Austria 
Brazil # Azerbaijan 
Bulgaria Bangladesh  
Canada  Bosnia and Herzegovina 
China Cameroon # 
Czech Republic Colombia # 
Finland Egypt # 
Germany Georgia 
India  Greece # 
Korea (South) Hong Kong  
Netherlands # Iceland 
Pakistan  Iraq # 
Romania Italy # 
Russia Kenya # 
South Africa  Latvia 
Spain # Macedonia 
Switzerland Morocco # 
United States  Nigeria  
 Poland 
  Turkey # 
 Vietnam 
Note: With the exception of the countries listed in Table A1, surveys were conducted for in a further 
eight countries. The question regarding the independent variable ―possibility of nuclear accident‖ 
was not asked in these countries. Hence, these countries are not used in the analysis. # indicates the 
countries where LEGAL takes 1. 
 
